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Abstract
We present a training system, which can provably
defend significantly larger neural networks
than previously possible, including ResNet-34
and DenseNet-100. Our approach is based
on differentiable abstract interpretation and
introduces two novel concepts: (i) abstract layers
for fine-tuning the precision and scalability of
the abstraction, (ii) a flexible domain specific
language (DSL) for describing training objectives
that combine abstract and concrete losses with
arbitrary specifications. Our training method is
implemented in the DiffAI system.
1. Introduction
Recent work has shown that neural networks are susceptible
to adversarial attacks Szegedy et al. (2013): small,
imperceptible perturbations which cause the network to
misclassify the input. This has led to growing interest
in training procedures to produce robust networks (Gu &
Rigazio, 2014; Zheng et al., 2016), new adversarial attacks
(Papernot et al., 2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017; Xiao
et al., 2018; Athalye & Sutskever, 2017; Evtimov et al.,
2017), as well as defenses which use these attacks during
training (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Trame`r et al., 2017;
Yuan et al., 2017; Huang et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2018;
Dong et al., 2018). While networks defended using attacks
may be experimentally robust, it has been shown that in
general more data is needed (Schmidt et al., 2018) and
that this style of training is sample inefficient (Khoury &
Hadfield-Menell, 2018). Further, while detecting advarsarial
attacks (Rozsa et al., 2016; Bhagoji et al., 2017; Feinman
et al., 2017; Grosse et al., 2017) appears a promising
contingency, Carlini & Wagner (2017) found that many
of these techniques were insufficient.
The list of possible attacks is extensive (e.g., (Akhtar &
Mian, 2018)) and constantly expanding, motivating the need
for methods which can ensure that neural networks are
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provably robust against these attacks. Katz et al. (2017)
developed a neural network verification system based on
SMT solvers, however it only scaled to small networks.
Gehr et al. (2018) introduced abstract interpretation (Cousot
& Cousot, 1977) as a method for verifying much larger
networks. However, as the size of networks that verification
systems could handle increased, it became clear that
verifiable robustness could be significantly improved by
employing provably robust training. The first attempts
for training provably robust networks (Raghunathan et al.,
2018; Kolter & Wong, 2017; Dvijotham et al., 2018)
scaled to small sizes with at most two convolutional layers.
Later work saw the development of two methods: (i) the
dual-method in the case of Wong et al. (2018), and (ii)
differentiable abstract interpretation introduced by Mirman
et al. (2018) (DiffAI) and used in Gowal et al. (2018)
(IBP) and Wang et al. (2018) (MixTrain). While these
pushed the boundary in terms of provable verified robustness
and network size (with networks of up to 230k neurons),
scaling a provable defense to a full ImageNet sized network
remains a key challenge. In particular, ResNet-34 represents
an important milestone to achieving this goal as it is the
smallest residual network proposed by He et al. (2016).
To address this challenge, we introduce a novel approach
to robustness, one where the network itself is designed to
be provably robust similar to attempts which aim to design
networks to be experimentally robust by construction (Cisse
et al., 2017; Sabour et al., 2017). In particular, we introduce
the paradigm of “programming to prove”, long known to
the programming languages community (Delahaye, 2000;
Wagner et al., 2013), as a technique for creating provably
robust architectures. We show how to integrate this idea
with DiffAI, resulting in a system than can train a provably
robust ResNet-34 (a smaller resnet is shown in Fig. 1).
Main Contributions Our main contributions are:
• The concept of an abstract layer which has no effect
on standard network execution but improves provably
robust learning.
• A domain specific language (DSL) for specifying
sophisticated training objectives.
• A complete implementation and evaluation of our
method. Our experimental results indicate the
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Figure 1. ResNet-Tiny with Abstract Layers. Layers with dark orange on their right include a ReLU, and the sphere with an r in it is also
a ReLU. Convks,p is a convolution with a kernel size of k, a stride of s, and a padding p, This net has 311k neurons and 18m parameters.
approach can achieve provable robustness for networks
an order of magnitude larger than prior work.
2. Background on Robust Training
We now provide necessary background on training neural
networks to be provably robust against adversarial examples.
A neural network Nθ : Rd → Rk maps a d-dimensional
input to a k-dimensional output based on learned weights θ.
LetBÔ(x) be the ü∞-ball of radius Ô around an input x ∈ Rd.
A network Nθ is called Ô-robust around a point x ∈ Rd if
∀x˜ ∈ BÔ(x), Nθ(x˜)i > Nθ(x˜)j where i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}
and j Ó= i. The goal of a robust training procedure is to
learn a θ such that: (i) Nθ assigns the correct class yi to
each training example xi, and (ii) Nθ is Ô-robust around
each example xi.
Differentiable Abstract Interpretation In this work we
leverage the differentiable abstract interpretation framework
introduced by Mirman et al. (2018). Here, one verifies
neural network robustness and formulates provability losses
by constructing sound overapproximations using abstract
interpretation (Cousot & Cousot, 1977). We now introduce
the necessary terms used later in the paper.
Definition 2.1. An abstract domain D consists of: (a)
abstract elements representing a set of concrete points in
P(Rp) for p ∈ N, (b) a concretization function γ : D →
P(Rp) mapping an abstract element d ∈ D to the set
of concrete points it represents, and (c) a set of abstract
transformers T# approximating the concrete transformer T
in P(Rp), i.e., T (γ(d)) ⊆ γ(T#(d)).
Our approach additionally requires the existence of an
abstraction function α : P(Rp) → D mapping the set
of concrete points in Rp to an abstract element d ∈ D.
Abstract transformers compose and hence by defining
abstract transformers for each basic operation in a neural
network N , we can derive an overall abstract transformer
T#N for the entire N . We apply abstract interpretation
to compute T#N (α(BÔ(x))), describing a superset of the
x3 := x1 + x2
x4 := x1 − x2
x3 := x1 + x2
x4 := x1 − x2
h1 = 〈0, 1〉
h2 = 〈0, 1〉 h3 = 〈0, 2〉
h4 = 〈0, 2〉
h1 = 〈0, 0, (1, 0)〉
h2 = 〈0, 0, (0, 1)〉 h3 = 〈0, 0, (1, 1)〉
h4 = 〈0, 0, (1, -1)〉
(a) Box
(b) Hybrid Zonotope
Figure 2. Comparing the precision of the affine transformers in the
(a) Box and (b) Hybrid Zonotope domains.
possible outputs of N for all inputs in BÔ(x) which can be
used to compute an abstract loss as in Mirman et al. (2018).
Hybrid Zonotope Domain In this work we use the
Hybrid Zonotope Domain as described by Mirman et al.
(2018). This domain, introduced originally by Goubault &
Putot (2008), is a generalization of two domains: (i) the
simple Box domain (the Box domain is also referred to
as interval bound propagation in Gowal et al. (2018)) and,
(ii) the base zonotope domain Ghorbal et al. (2009). The
main benefit of hybrid zonotopes is that they allow for more
fine-grained control of analysis precision and performance.
The Hybrid Zonotope domain associates with every
computed result v (e.g., a neuron) in the network, a triplet
hv = 〈(hC)v, (hB)v, (hE)v〉 where h = 〈hC , hV , hE〉 and
is referred to as the hybrid zonotope over all p variables.
Here, (hC)v ∈ R is a center point, (hB)v ∈ R≥0 is
a non-negative uncorrelated error coefficient (similar to
the Box domain), and (hE)v ∈ Rm are the correlated
error coefficients the number m of which determine the
accuracy of the domain. These coefficients define an affine
function ĥ which is parameterized by the correlated error
terms e ∈ [−1, 1]m and an uncorrelated error term
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β ∈ [−1, 1]p:
ĥ(β, e) = (h1(β, e), . . . , hp(β, e))
where:
ĥv(β, e) = (hC)v + (hB)v · βv + (hE)v · e
Different variables share the correlated error terms
which introduces dependencies between variables making
over-approximations more precise than those produced
with the Box domain (which does not track dependencies).
Formally, the concretization function γH of a hybrid
zonotope h is
γH(h) = {ĥ(β, e) | β ∈ [−1, 1]p, e ∈ [−1, 1]m}.
A box b can be expressed as a hybrid zonotope h with
hC = bC (the box’s center), hB = bB (the box’s radius) and
m = 0. Descriptions of our hybrid zonotope transformers
(e.g., ReLU), can be found in Mirman et al. (2018).
Interval concretization For operations such as
constructing an abstract loss or building heuristics in
abstract layers, it is necessary to determine the bounds of
a hybrid zonotope h for the i-th variable using interval
concretization:
ιH(h)i = [(hC)i − ÔH(h)i, (hC)i + ÔH(h)i]
where ÔH(h)i = (hB)i +
∑m
j=1 |(hE)i,j | is the total error.
Example: Box vs. Hybrid Zonotope Fig. 2 shows
an affine transformation on inputs abstracted in both
the Box and the Hybrid Zonotope domains. The box
representation in Fig. 2 (a) only contains the center and
the uncorrelated error coefficients whereas the hybrid
zonotope representation in Fig. 2 (b) also contains non-zero
correlated error coefficients. The affine transformation
creates dependency between x3 and x4 as they are assigned
values using affine expressions defined over the same
variables x1 and x2. The Box domain cannot capture
this and as a result its output is less precise (contains
more concrete points) than the one produced with Hybrid
Zonotope domain.
3. Abstract Layers for Verifiable Networks
Program verification often involves both the addition of
erasable annotations (Bo¨hme et al., 2008) and program
transformations to make the resulting (semantically
equivalent program) more suitable for verification (Wagner
et al., 2013). That is, unlike standard transformations which
aim to produce a program that runs faster, here, the goal is
to produce a more verifiable program. Our key insight is to
leverage this “programming to prove” paradigm in a similar
fashion when designing robust neural networks.
Based on this insight, we describe the novel concept of
Abstract Layers. These layers are specifically provided by
the network designer but differ from traditional concrete
layers in that they have no effect on the concrete execution.
Instead, they only affect the analysis of the network, i.e.,
they only modify abstract elements that propagate through
the layers (e.g., boxes or hybrid zonotopes).
We describe two types of abstract layers designed to tune
the precision and scalability of the analysis with the Hybrid
Zonotope domain. For all abstract layers, we describe their
effect on a given hybrid zonotope h with m correlated error
coefficients, producing a new hybrid zonotope h′. For our
abstract layers, it holds that h′C = hC .
3.1. Correlation layers
A correlation layer increases the precision of the analysis in
successive layers by producing a new hybrid zonotope h′
which contains more correlated error coefficients than the
original input h. We note that here we have γ(h′) = γ(h),
that is, both hybrid zonotopes actually represent the same
set of points. However, the advantage of h′ over h is that
h′ contains more shared dependencies between different
dimensions (variables) than h, meaning that successive steps
of the analysis using h′ will be produce more precise results
than those same steps using h.
Informally, a correlation layer selects a set of dimension
indices (variables) P and creates |P | new correlated error
coefficients. For each selected variable i ∈ P , we introduce
one correlated error coefficient whose value is that of the
variable’s uncorrelated error coefficient. All other remaining
correlated coefficients (a total of |P | − 1) for i are set to
0. For all variables not in P , their new correlated error
coefficients are all set to 0. More formally, given h, we
define h′ as follows:
h′B,i = hB,i i /∈ P
h′B,i = 0 i ∈ P
h′E,i,j = hE,i,j ∀0 ≤ i < p, 0 ≤ j < m
h′E,i,m+t = hB,i i ∈ P ∧ t = |P<i|
h′E,i,m+t = 0 ∀t < |P |.i /∈ P ∨ t Ó= |P<i|
Here we use P<i to denote the subset of P where each
element is smaller than i. Next, we define four variants of a
correlation layer based on the choice of the set P .
CorrelateAll correlates all uncorrelated coefficients in all
p dimensions thereby adding p correlated error coefficients.
Formally, it uses P = {i | 0 ≤ i < p}.
CorrelateFixedk correlates k fixed dimensions, chosen by
taking every pk of the flattened list of dimension indices.
Formally, we have P = {å i·pk æ | 0 ≤ i < k}.
CorrelateMaxk correlates the first k dimensions whose
interval concretization (see Section 2) has the largest upper
bound value. This heuristic aims to improve precision
while still keeping the analysis scalable. Formally, we have
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x1
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x4
x5
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x4
x5
x6
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x8
x9
x7
x8
x9
x10
x11
x12
[-1,1]
[-1,1]
[-1,1]
Input layer First hidden layer θ1 CorrelateMax2 Second hidden layer θ2 DecorrelateMin1 Output layer θ3
h1 = 〈0, 1〉
h2 = 〈0, 1〉
h3 = 〈0, 1〉
θ1
h4 = 〈0, 0.75〉
h5 = 〈0, 1.25〉
h6 = 〈0, 0.5〉
h4 = 〈0, 0, (0.75, 0)〉
h5 = 〈0, 0, (0, 1.25)〉
h6 = 〈0, 0.5, (0, 0)〉
θ2
h7 = 〈0, 0, (1,−1)〉
h8 = 〈0, 0, (1, 0.5)〉
h9 = 〈0, 0, (0, 0)〉
h7 = 〈0, 1, (1)〉
h8 = 〈0, 0.5, (1)〉
h9 = 〈0, 0, (0)〉
θ3
h10 = 〈0, 0, (1)〉
h11 = 〈0, 0.5, (0.5)〉
h12 = 〈0, 0, (0)〉
Figure 3. Our analysis on an example toy network augmented with abstract layers.
P = {i | UB(ιH(h)i) ∈ TOPk(UB(ιH(h)))} where TOPk
returns the k largest elements and UB returns the upper
bound of an interval.
CorrelateMaxPoolc,w,h,s correlates dimensions chosen
using MaxPooling (Krizhevsky et al., 2012). We apply
MaxPooling with kernel size (c, w, h) and stride s on a
function f defined over h. If the correlation is applied before
the first layer then f = hC otherwise f = hB . Formally,
P = {i | f(i) ∈ MAXPOOLc,w,h,s(f)}.
3.2. Decorrelation layers
The purpose of decorrelation layers is opposite that of
correlation layers: to reduce the number of correlated
coefficients so to make analysis for successive layers more
efficient but less precise. Concretely, a decorrelation layer
removes correlated error coefficients and adds their absolute
sum to the value of uncorrelated error coefficients in each
dimension. We now introduce two choices for the set P ,
each defining different dimensions to be decorelated:
DecorrelateAll produces a hybrid zonotope with no
correlated coefficients in any dimension and in each
dimension, the uncorrelated coefficient is defined as:
h′B,i = hB,i +
m−1∑
j=0
|hE,i,j |
DecorrelateMink is based on a heuristic to minimize the
loss of precision due to decorrelation by removing m− k
correlated error coefficients whose absolute sum in all
dimensions is the smallest. As a result, k correlated
coefficients remain in the output. Formally, we define
P to be the indices of the m − k smallest elements of
the sequence {∑p−1i=0 |hE,i,j |}j=0...m−1. Then, the new
zonotope h′, where i ∈ [0, p), is defined as:
h′B,i = hB,i +
∑
j∈P |hE,i,j |
h′E,i,j = hE,i,t t /∈ P ∧ j = t− |P<t|
Informally, in the first equation, we accumulate all
correlated coefficients chosen for removal (that is, the set P )
into the uncorrelated coefficient, while the second equation
ensures the remaining correlated coefficients are shifted to
be next to each other (order is preserved).
3.3. DeepLoss
For deeper neural networks such as ResNet-18, it is possible
for naive abstraction imprecision to grow exponentially
to the point where overflow occurs before the final loss
is calculated, making optimizing that loss futile. In such
cases, we would like the network to produce more precise
results in intermediate layers, before an overflow occurs.
As these layers do not have the same number of neurons as
target classifications, we cannot optimize using a standard
provability loss. Instead, a loss on a generic heuristic for
provability must be defined on the output of a specific
layer. As this loss does not effect concrete execution and
operates using the abstract element from a specific layer,
we also consider it a form of an abstract layer. We define
the following losses on an interval concretization c in n
dimensions:
Llb,f,i(c) = max{f(cj,2 − ci,1) | cj,1 ≤ ci,1}
Lub,f,i(c) = max{f(ci,2 − cj,1) | ci,2 ≤ cj,2}
Ldeep,f (d) = 12n
∑n−1
i=0 (Llb,f,i(ι(d)) + Lub,f,i(ι(d)))
where f is a positive activation and Ldeep,f combines the
first two losses for each dimension of an arbitrary abstract
element d. Intuitively, this loss measures and sums for
each dimension the worst offending overlap between the
concretization lower bound in that dimension and the upper
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bound of any other dimension, and visa versa.
In our experiments, we used ReLU for f . A naive
implementation of the above loss would require n2
computations (and potentially n2 space on a GPU), which
could be problematic given that the loss is intended to be
used on the output of an intermediate, and presumably
quite wide, layer. While a matrix multiplication would
also typically involve using up to an n2 sized matrix,
this loss is intended to be used between convolutions
which typically permits significantly wider outputs through
utilizing significantly smaller kernels. We implement it
leveraging one dimensional MaxPool and Sort so that
marshaling between the CPU and GPU is not required,
and such that algorithmic optimizations to MaxPool
can be leveraged to potentially1 provide an O(n logn)
implementation.
3.4. Example network with abstract layers
Fig. 3 shows our analysis with abstract layers on an example
toy feedforward network. The neural network contains
three neurons per layer. We add a CorrelateMax2 and a
DecorrelateMin1 abstract layers after the first and second
hidden layer respectively. We show the 3-dimensional
shapes propagated through each layer along with the
corresponding hybrid zonotope based encoding. The top,
middle, and bottom neurons in each layer represent the x,y,
and z-directions in the shapes. Our analysis abstracts the
input region with a Box and propagates it through the first
hidden layer. After correlations are added, the abstraction is
shown in blue (before correlations, the shape is gray).
CorrelateMax2 changes the encoding of the abstract
element obtained after the first hidden layer by creating
correlated error coefficients for neurons x4 and x5 whose
upper bound is larger than that for x6. The introduction
of correlated error coefficients increases the precision of
the result obtained after applying the transformers for the
second hidden layer as the resulting shape is no longer a
box. We note that neuron x9 is set to 0 in the result.
DecorrelateMin1 removes the second correlated error
coefficient as its absolute sum over all neurons is smaller.
The absolute value of this coefficient is added to the
uncorrelated coefficient in each dimension. This changes
the concretization of the abstract element by removing
dependencies making it less imprecise while increasing
scalability. The output layer transformations next produce
a result more precise than the box obtained without the
abstract layers.
1Provided an optimal implementation of MaxPool
(a) δ = 0.2 (a) δ = 0.35
Figure 4. Five two-dimensional abstractions (orange boxes)
produced by αg where g is Sample(δ,Normal,Box)
4. Specifying Training Objectives
We introduce a domain specific language (DSL) for
specifying training objectives and parameter scheduling.
For example, it can capture the training loss and scheduling
proposed by Gowal et al. (2018) (IBP).
4.1. Specifying Schedules
We describe two constructors for describing a schedule used
to adjust the values of training parameters (e.g., size of the
balls around images used in training) dynamically, leading
to improved results. A schedule is a function which uses
the current training time step corresponding to the fractional
number of epochs completed (e.g., completing 25000 of the
50000 examples from the first epoch on CIFAR10 would
provide a time-step value of 0.5). The constructors below
describe how to (recursively) build this function.
Lin(a, b,m, n) specifies the parameter value should be the
start value a for the first m epochs. Then, linear parameter
annealing between start value a and end value b over n
epochs should be used to determine the parameter value.
Until(m, s1, s2) specifies that the first-schedule constructor
s1 will be used to determine the parameter value until m
epochs are reached, and then the second-schedule s2 will be
used but will be given the time with m epochs subtracted.
4.2. Specifying Training Goals
We next describe the goal-constructors for describing how to
build the abstraction function and training loss. At timestep
s of training a network N on an example o with a target
label (t), for each goal constructor (g) in the abstract syntax
tree (AST), we build: (i) an abstraction function (αg) which
takes the input box for training specified by the lower (l)
and upper bound (u) vectors as input and returns an abstract
element d = αg(l, u), and (ii) a loss function lossg(d, t).
Before training, the user provides the goal which is parsed
into an AST (gU ) and a training width (Ô). The loss used to
train is, for a dataset with values in the range of a to b:
lossgU (T#N (αgU (max(o− Ô, a),min(o+ Ô, b))), t).
Table 1 formalizes our goal constructors, described below:
Point returns the center of the input box specified by l and
u for training and uses the cross entropy loss.
Normal returns a point sampled from the normal
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Table 1. Our different goal constructors for training. Each assumes the existence of a target label t.
Goal constructor abstract element d = α(l, u) loss(d, t)
Point l+u2 cross-entropy(d, t)
Normal MAX(MIN(0.5 · (u− l) · NORMAL RAND(0) + l, l), u) cross-entropy(d, t)
Uniform MAX(MIN(0.5 · (u− l) · (UNIFORM RAND(2)− 1) + l, l), u) cross-entropy(d, t)
IFGSMk FGSM(k, l, u, t) cross-entropy(d, t)
Box 〈 l+u2 , l−u2 , 0〉 cross-entropy(d, t)
Mix(g1, g2, λ) (d1, d2) = αg1 (l, u) ×αg2 (l, u) (1- λ)·lossg1 (d1, t)+λ · lossg2 (d2, t)
Sub(δ, g) αg(0.5 · (u+ l − δ · (u− l)), 0.5 · (u+ l + δ · (u− l), t) lossg(d, t)
Sample(δ, r, gs, gt) αgt (b− 0.5 · δ(u− l), b+ 0.5 · δ(u− l), t) where lossgt (d, t)
b = CENTER(Sub(1− r · δ, gs))
BiSample(g1,g2) αg2 (l′, u′, t) where lossg2 (d, t)
l′ = 0.5 · (l + u)− |UB(αg1(l, u))- 0.5 · (l + u)| and
u′ = 0.5 · (l + u) + |UB(αg1(l, u))- 0.5 · (l + u)|
Table 2. Training schemes used for the experiments. Those with subscript 18 or L are used by ResNet-18 or ResNetLarge respectively.
Name Training Scheme
Baseline Mix(Point, Sub(Lin(0, 1, 150, 10), Box), Lin(0, 0.5, 150, 10))
InSamp Mix(Point, Sample(Lin(0, 1, 150, 10), 0.5, Normal, Box), Lin(0, 0.5, 150, 10))
InSampLPA Mix(Point, Sub(Lin(0,1,150,10), Sample(Lin(0,1,150,10), 0.5, Normal, Box)), Lin(0, 0.5, 150, 10))
AdvkIS Mix(Sub(Lin(0, 1, 20, 20), IFGSMk), Sample(Lin(0, 1, 150, 10), 0.5, Normal, Box), Lin(0, 0.5, 150, 10))
AdvkISLPA Mix(Sub(Lin(0, 1, 20, 20), IFGSMk),
Sub(Lin(0,1,150,10),Sample(Lin(0, 1, 150, 10), 0.5, Normal, Box)), Lin(0, 0.5, 150, 10))
AdvkISLPAUS Mix(Sub(Lin(0, 1, 20, 20), IFGSMk),
Sub(Lin(0,1,150,10),Sample(Lin(0, 1, 150, 10), Uniform1, Box)), Lin(0, 0.35, 150, 10))
BaselineS18 Mix(Point, Sub(Lin(0, 1, 200, 40), Box), Lin(0, 0.5, 200, 40))
InSampS18 Mix(Point, Sample(Lin(0, 1, 200, 40), 0.5, Normal, Box), Lin(0, 0.5, 200, 40))
AdvkISS18 Mix(Sub(Lin(0, 1, 20, 20), IFGSMk), Sample(Lin(0, 1, 200, 40), 0.5, Normal, Box), Lin(0, 0.5, 200, 40))
BaselineS18 Mix(Point, Sub(Lin(0, 1, 200, 40), Box), Lin(0, 0.5, 200, 40))
InSampS18 Mix(Point, Sample(Lin(0, 1, 200, 40), 0.5, Normal, Box), Lin(0, 0.5, 200, 40))
AdvkISS18 Mix(Sub(Lin(0, 1, 20, 20), IFGSMk), Sample(Lin(0, 1, 200, 40), 0.5, Normal, Box), Lin(0, 0.5, 200, 40))
AdvkISLPAR18 Mix(Sub(Lin(0, 1, 20, 20), IFGSMk),
Sub(Lin(0,1,200,40),Sample(Lin(0, 1, 200, 40), 1, Uniform, Box)), Lin(0, 0.5, 200, 40))
InSampLPAR34 Mix(Point, Sub(Lin(0,1,200,40), Sample(Lin(0, 1, 200, 40), 1, Uniform, Box)), Lin(0, 0.5, 200, 40))
AdvkISLPAD100 Mix(IFGSMk, Sub(Lin(0,1,150,50),Sample(Lin(0, 1, 150, 50), 1, Uniform, Box)), Lin(0, 0.5, 150, 50))
BiAdvL Mix(IFGSM2, BiSample(Sub(Lin(0, 1, 150, 30), IFGSM3), Lin(0, 0.6, 200, 30))
distribution around the input box (via the function
NORMAL RAND) and clipped to that box. It uses the cross
entropy loss.
IFGSMk uses k iterations of FGSM to find an adversarial
example in the input box and uses the corresponding point
for training. The cross entropy loss is used.
Box returns a hybrid zonotope abstract element with no
correlated error coefficients abstracting the box between the
lower (l) and upper-bound (u). The loss concretizes the
abstract element d and returns the maximum cross entropy
loss on a point in the concretization (Gowal et al., 2018).
Mix(g1, g2, λ) takes two goal constructors g1 and g2 and a
float λ as inputs. The abstract element used for training is
the cartesian product of the abstractions d1 and d2 of the
input box in g1 and g2. The loss linearly combines the loss
functions from g1 and g2 using λ.
Sub(δ, g) takes a float δ and a goal constructor g as inputs.
It computes the abstract element for training by calling
the abstraction function αg of the constructor g using the
new bounds l′ = 0.5 · (u + l − δ · (u − l)) and u′ =
0.5·(u+l+δ ·(u−l)). The insight behind this constructor is
to use training elements constructed from boxes that overlap
with the input box. The output loss is the loss from g.
Sample(δ, gs, gt) uses Sub(1 − δ, gs) to find a point b, by
taking the center of the returned training element, and passes
l′ = b − 0.5 · δ(u − l) and u′ = b + 0.5 · δ(u − l) to the
abstraction function αgt of gt. The output loss is from gt.
This is visualized in Fig. 4.
BiSample(g1, g2) uses the abstract element
αg1(l, u, t) for the input in g1 and computes
l′ = 0.5 · (l + u)− |(UB(αg1(l, u)))− 0.5 · (l + u)|
and u′ = 0.5 · (l+ u) + |(UB(αg1(l, u)))− 0.5 · (l+ u)| .
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The output element is αg2(l′, u′, t). It uses g2’s loss.
We note that floating point parameters such as δ and λ used
in the constructors above can use scheduling constructors.
4.3. Example Training Schemes
Earlier, we observed that our training DSL could be used to
specify complex training schemes such as IBP. In particular,
IBP uses linear parameter annealing on both the epsilon used
in training and the weight of the provability loss, together
with a cross entropy based loss function instead of the
hinge loss designed by Mirman et al. (2018) (DiffAI). Using
this customization, IBP improves on the results of DiffAI
while still using the interval domain for training as done by
DiffAI. In our DSL, this training scheme could be written as:
Mix(Point, Sub(Lin(0,1,150,10), Box), Lin(0,0.5, 150,10)).
In Table 2, we show a number of example training schemes
captured as expressions in our DSL. We found the following
schemes to be particularly useful (these are evaluated next):
InSamp interpolates between training on random points in
the L∞ Ô-Ball and an abstract box surrounding the example.
The idea is that it might be easier to train a network on a
point to be Ô robust if instead of it being only Ô− µ robust
already, every point around in the Ô box around it is also
Ô− µ robust for small µ > 0.
InSampLPA is the same as InSamp, but also uses
scheduling for the size of the sampling domain, by
surrounding it with Sub. The idea is that using the sampling
domain is a kind of adversarial training, and it might be
easier for the network to learn the standard dataset first.
5. Experimental Setup
Our system, and the code for reproducing experiments, is
publicly available at https://github.com/eth-sri/diffai. We
implemented this system using PyTorch-0.4.1. We ran all
experiments using GeForce RTX 2080 Ti GPUs. We do not
use weight normalization reparameterization and clipping.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our technique, we
evaluate using the most challenging dataset commonly
used for provable verification tasks, CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky,
2009). We also use the largest commonly used epsilon,
Ô = 0.031373 ∼ 8/255. All accuracies and verifiable
robustness percentages use the full 10,000 image test set.
To augment the dataset and make it easier to learn, random
cropping with a padding of 4 was used (this maintains image
size) as well as random horizontal flipping.
While IBP and MixTrain presented improvements to robust
training, we did not compare against these systems. For IBP,
the public code did not contain residual networks though we
were able to integrate the proposed training improvements
into DiffAI. For MixTain, the codebase was unavailable,
and we chose not to perform normalization on the dataset
prior to usage. Instead, we add a fixed layer to each network
in order to make attack and verification epsilons easier to
compare across different systems.
For testing the attacked accuracy, we used MI-FGSM (Dong
et al., 2018) with µ = 0.8, 20 iterations, and a step size of
0.0031373. To test verifiable robustness, we used DiffAI’s
built-in Hybrid-Zonotope domain (described earlier).
5.1. Evaluated Networks
A brief overview of the network sizes we evaluate on and
their training speed under well performing training schemes,
is shown in Table 3. To the best of our knowledge, no other
system can train as deep and as large provable networks as
our system. In the Appendix, we provide the complete table
for all training schemes. Next, we give a brief description
of these networks and our training parameters.
ResNet-Tiny is a wide residual network, 12 layers deep,
similar to the ResNet described by Wong et al. (2018) but
with more and wider layers shown in Fig. 1. It has 50%
more neurons than the largest CIFAR10 network trained via
IBP or Wang et al. (2018). For this network we always use
an initial learning rate of 0.001 with a schedule as used by
IBP, and Adam optimization (Kingma & Ba, 2014). We also
use an L2 regularization constant of 0.01.
SkipNet-18 is an 18 layer deep network with 4 residual
connections adapted from PyTorch’s vision library. For this
network we always use an initial learning rate of 0.1 and a
schedule where the rate is multiplied by 0.1 at steps 10, 20,
250 and 300. Instead of Adam, standard SGD is used. The
L2 regularization constant is set to 0.0005.
ResNet-18 and ResNet-34 are 18 and 34 layer
(respectively) deep residual networks adapted from
PyTorch’s vision library. For these network we always use
an initial learning rate of 0.1 and a similar schedule where
the rate is multiplied by 0.1 at steps 10, 20, 250, 300, and
350, and a batch size of 200. We also use SGD here, but do
not use any regularization.
DenseNet-100 is a network with 99 layers, and many
residual connections, adapted from the models proposed
by Huang et al. (2017). To our knowledge, this is the largest
network in terms of depth and the number of neurons to have
been provably trained so far. For this network, we always
use an initial learning rate of 0.1 and a schedule where the
rate is multiplied by 0.1 at steps 20, 50, 200, 250, and 300.
We also use SGD here, and no regularization, and a batch
size of 50. Due to its size, it is only verified using the Box
domain and not with the hybrid Zonotope domain.
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Table 3. List of networks, and the training schemes that achieved the highest provable robustness.
Net Neurons Params Abstract Layers Training Scheme s/epoch Accuracy % Verified Robustness %
ResNet-Tiny 312k 18m ManyFixed Adv1ISLPAUS 303 40.2 23.2
SkipNet-18 558k 15m None Adv5ISS18 260 28.4 21.2
ResNet-Large 639k 66m LargeCombo BiAdvL 527 38.1 3.0
ResNet-18 558k 15m None Adv5ISLPAR18 233 32.3 22.3
ResNet-34 967k 25m None InSampLPAR34 176 35.1 19.5
DenseNet-100 4.5m 748k None Adv5ISLPAD100 727 36.4 21.9
5.2. Abstract Layers
To evaluate the effect of abstract layers, we investigated a
variety of configurations for the above networks. For all
of our networks, we use CorrelateAll before the last linear
layer during both training and testing. This has the effect of
not causing any loss of accuracy by that linear layer before
the concretization of the loss function.
None means that no additional abstract layers are used.
FewCombo for ResNet-Tiny, has a CorrelateMax32 layer
before the first layer, a DecorrelateMin8 after the first layer,
a DecorrelateMin4 after the first wide residual block, a
DecorrelateAll after the second wide residual block, and a
CorrelateMax10 before the fully connected layers.
ManyFixed for ResNet-Tiny, has a CorrelateMax32
layer before the first layer, a CorrelateFixed16 then
DecorrelateMin16 after the first layer, a CorrelateFixed8
then DecorrelateMin8 after the first and second wide blocks,
and a CorrelateFixed4 then DecorrelateMin4 after the third
wide block, and a DecorrelateAll after the fourth.
Combo for SkipNet-18, has pairs of CorrelateFixedk and
DecorrelateMinå0.5kæ with k = 20, 10, 5 after layers 3, 4
and 5 respectively and uses DeepLoss after the fourth layer
with a weight schedule of Until(90, Lin(0, 0.2, 50, 40), 0).
LargeCombo for ResNet-Large, has a CorrelateFixed4
then DecorrelateMin4 before wide residual blocks 1, 2,
3, and 4. Before the wide residual block 5, we place
DecorrelateMin2. It uses DeepLoss after block 2 and 5,
with weight schedules of Until(1, 0, Lin(0.5, 0, 50, 3)) and
Until(24,Lin(0, 0.1, 20, 4), Lin(0.1, 0, 50)).
A complete description of each network with each abstract
layer combination can be found in the Appendix, along with
a table showing its performance for every training scheme.
6. Experimental Results
We now demonstrate how our training schemes shown in
Table 2 (and discussed earlier) can be used to train provably
robust networks of sizes an order of magnitude larger than
prior work. We additionally show how abstract layers can
be used to further push the envelope of provable robustness.
Table 4. Comparison of abstract layers on ResNet-Tiny.
Layers s/epoch Acc% Attck% Ver%
None 130 29.4 21.4 17.7
FewCombo 220 29.0 21.9 19.6
ManyFixed 345 28.9 21.4 19.2
Comparing Training Schemes and Abstract Layers To
evaluate which combinations of training schemes and
abstract layers provide the best results, we first trained
ResNet-Tiny using four training schemes both without
abstract layers, and with the abstract layer setup described
by FewCombo. We trained each for 400 epochs. The
complete results are included in the Appendix, here we
show the accuracy and verified robustness in Figure 5.
We can observe that using abstract layers improves both
provable robustness and accuracy when a more complex
training scheme is used, and that benefits exist for provable
robustness as well. When the objective is only to maximize
provable robustness, the training schemes (there are several)
which utilize InSamp and abstract layers, are optimal.
Without abstract layers, inclusion sampling alone appears
to have a benefit on accuracy without significant detriment
to provable robustness.
To further investigate the effect of abstract layers, we
compare the results of training three configurations of
abstract layers on ResNet-Tiny. These can be seen in Table 4,
which shows the results on the test set after training with
Adv1ISLPA for 350 epochs.
In this experiment, we can see that ManyFixed actually does
not perform as well as FewCombo in any metric, while
for verified robustness both networks with abstract layers
outperform the network without abstract layers.
While ManyFixed contains many more abstract layers
and uses more correlation (thus making it significantly
slower to train), the layers in FewCombo have been chosen
more selectively. ManyFix contains multiple iterations
of CorrelateFixk immediately before DecorrelateMink of
decreasing size. We hypothesize that placing a CorrelateFix
immediately before DecorrelateMin diminishes the utility
of DecorrelateMin’s heuristic. As uncorrelated error
coefficients tend to accumulate and grow while correlated
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Figure 5. A toy comparison of Accuracy (a) and Verified Robustness (b) of training schemes with similar parameters to Baseline on
ResNet-Tiny with and without abstract layers.
Table 5. Comparison of training instances on SkipNet-18.
Scheme Layers s/epoch Acc% Attck% Ver%
Baseline18 None 152 10.2 - -
InSamp18 None 102 28.5 23.4 20.5
Adv5IS18 None 260 28.4 23.8 21.2
InSamp18 Combo 342 29.5 23 18.5
error terms tend to shrink, a saddle point is generated
wherein the network would need to maximize error
coefficients (and thus decreasing accuracy) for neurons
decided previously to be important (which will become
correlated) and minimize error coefficients (and thus
increasing accuracy) for neurons that will be decided to be
unimportant in order to keep the coefficients from switching.
In summary, FewCombo is more efficient and more accurate
than ManyFixed and is a key example for the necessity of
the “programming to prove” methodology.
Scaling to SkipNet-18 In order to build a defense scheme
capable of training SkipNet-18 we found it necessary to, at
a minimum, use InSamp18 training. Table 5 demonstrates
the result of training SkipNet-18 with a variety of training
schemes for 400 epochs2. One can observe that Baseline
diverged and while InSamp18 without abstract layers or
DeepLoss was able to train a SkipNet-18 model with
highest provable robustness, the highest accuracy was
obtained using the same training scheme and Combo
abstract layers. The training scheme Adv5IS18 achieved
a better compromise between provable robustness and
accuracy.
Larger And More Complex Architectures While
the majority of our comparisons were performed on
ResNet-Tiny and SkipNet-18 we use our schemes to scale to
significantly larger networks. To show this, we designed a
larger wide residual network, ResNet-Large, with 70k more
neurons than SkipNet-18 and 66 million parameters (more
2 Baseline was stopped early at 350 epochs as it had clearly
failed to train.
than four times as many as SkipNet-18). Here, we found
it necessary to use a combination of previously evaluated
techniques, in addition to two DeepLoss layers.
For this network we used the BiAdvL training scheme,
which constructs abstract boxes from adversarial attacks.
As training this network was significantly more expensive,
taking 527 seconds per epoch, we halted training after 100
epochs. The results for this network can be seen in Table 3.
While neither the accuracy nor verifiable robustness are
particularly competitive with smaller networks, this is the
deepest network (by shortest path from input to output) to
have proved robust for a competitive epsilon value and that
also comes with non-trivial accuracy. While ResNet-34
and DenseNet-100 have longer paths from input to output,
they also have very short paths which means that they could
potentially learn a small and provably robust network first
as an easier sub-problem.
On deeper networks and larger networks that have more
residual connections, we found that abstract layers were not
as necessary for training. Here, we hypothesize that the
network can provably learn the smaller network without the
residual layers first, and then use them as possible when
they do not too seriously hurt or provability. Table 3 also
shows the results of training ResNet-18, ResNet-34, and
DenseNet-100. The largest, DenseNet-100 is 4.5 times the
number of neurons to appear in any other paper at the time
of this publication to have a non-trivial number of points
verified to be robust.
7. Conclusion
We introduced a method for training provably robust
networks based on the novel concept of abstract layers and
a domain specific language for specifying complex training
objectives. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates
that our approach is effective in training provably robust
networks that are an order of magnitude larger than those
considered in prior work.
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A. Evaluation
Table 6. The networks compared and their sizes and speeds under different training schemes.
Network Name Neurons Parameters Abstract Layers Training Scheme Batch Size Seconds Per Epoch
ResNet-Tiny 311796 18415231
None
Baseline 50 106
InSamp 50 106
InSampLPA 50 107
Adv1ISLPA 50 161
Adv3ISLPA 50 130
FewCombo
Baseline 50 209
InSamp 50 205
InSampLPA 50 206
Adv1ISLPA 50 220
Adv3ISLPA 50 265
ManyFixed Adv1ISLPA 50 347
SkipNet-18 558080 15626634
None
Baseline18 200 152
InSamp18 200 102
Adv5IS18 200 260
Combo InSamp18 100 342
ResNet-Large 639976 65819474 LargeCombo BiAdvL 50 527
ResNet-Large 558k 18m ResNet-18 Adv5ISLPAR18 200 233
ResNet-Large 967k 25m ResNet-34 InSampLPAR34 200 176
Table 7. Comparison of different abstract layers and training schemes on ResNet-Tiny.
Train Scheme Abstract Layers Seconds Per Epoch Standard Accuracy % Attacked Accuracy % Verified Robust %
Baseline None 105 32.9 23.7 19.6FewCombo 209 32.7 24.1 19.2
InSamp None 106 33.6 24.7 19.3FewCombo 205 30 23.2 20.3
InSampLPA None 107 30.1 22.5 19.2FewCombo 206 31.1 23 20.7
Adv3ISLPA
None 161 28.2 22.2 19.2
FewCombo 267 28.4 22.5 20.4
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B. Further Accuracy Results for MNIST
Table 8. Networks for MNIST.
Network Name Neurons Parameters Depth (ReLUs)
FFNN 500 119910 5
ConvSmall 3604 89606 3
ConvMed 4804 166406 3
ConvBig 48064 1974762 6
ConvLargeIBP 175816 5426402 6
TruncatedVGG 151040 13109706 5
Table 9. MNIST with 0.1
Network Standard Accuracy PGD Accuracy HBox Provability
FFNN 93.3% 90.8% 88.9%
ConvSmall 97.8% 96.2% 95.5%
ConvMed 97.8% 96.3% 95.5%
ConvBig 98.5% 97.2% 95.6%
ConvLargeIBP 98.7% 97.5% 95.8%
TruncatedVGG 98.9% 97.7% 95.6%
Table 10. MNIST with Ô = 0.3.
Network Standard Accuracy PGD Accuracy HBox Provability
FFNN 80.2% 73.4% 62.6%
ConvSmall 96.9% 93.6% 89.1%
ConvMed 96.6% 93.1% 89.3%
ConvBig 97.0% 95.2% 87.8%
ConvLargeIBP 97.2% 95.4% 88.8%
TruncatedVGG 96.5% 94.4% 87.6%
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C. Further Accuracy Results for CIFAR10
Table 11. Networks for CIFAR10.
Network Name Neurons Parameters Depth (ReLUs)
FFNN 500 348710 5
ConvSmall 4852 125318 3
ConvMed 6244 214918 3
ConvBig 62464 2466858 6
ConvLargeIBP 229576 6963554 6
TruncatedVGG 197120 17043018 5
Table 12. CIFAR10 with Ô = 3/255.
Network Standard Accuracy PGD Accuracy HBox Provability
FFNN 45.1% 37.0% 33.1%
ConvSmall 56.1% 46.2% 42.4%
ConvMed 56.9% 46.6% 43.2%
ConvBig 61.9% 51.4% 45.0%
ConvLargeIBP 61.1% 51.4% 44.5%
TruncatedVGG 62.3% 51.4% 45.5%
Table 13. CIFAR10 with Ô = 8/255.
Network Standard Accuracy PGD Accuracy HBox Provability
FFNN 33.5% 23.8% 19.0%
ConvSmall 42.6% 30.5% 24.9%
ConvMed 43.6% 30.3% 24.7%
ConvBig 46.0% 34.2% 25.2%
ConvLargeIBP 46.2% 34.7% 27.2%
TruncatedVGG 45.9% 34.4% 27.0%
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D. Networks and Abstract Layers
Figure 6. ResNet-Tiny, None
Normalize mean=[0.4914, 0.4822, 0.4465] std=[0.2023, 0.1994, 0.201]
Conv2D, filters=16, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 3], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
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ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
Linear out=500
ReLU
CorrelateAll only_train=False
Linear out=10
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Figure 7. ResNet-Tiny, FewCombo
Normalize mean=[0.4914, 0.4822, 0.4465] std=[0.2023, 0.1994, 0.201]
CorrMaxK only_train=True num_correlate=32
Conv2D, filters=16, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 3], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
DecorrMin only_train=True k=8 num_to_keep=True
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=16, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 16], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=16, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 16], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=16, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 16], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
DecorrMin only_train=True k=4 num_to_keep=True
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 16], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 16], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
Concretize only_train=True
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
CorrMaxK only_train=True num_correlate=10
Linear out=500
ReLU
CorrelateAll only_train=False
Linear out=10
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Figure 8. ResNet-Tiny, ManyFixed
Normalize mean=[0.4914, 0.4822, 0.4465] std=[0.2023, 0.1994, 0.201]
CorrMaxK only_train=True num_correlate=32
Conv2D, filters=16, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 3], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
CorrFix only_train=True k=16
DecorrMin only_train=True k=16 num_to_keep=True
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=16, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 16], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=16, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 16], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=16, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 16], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
CorrFix only_train=True k=8
DecorrMin only_train=True k=8 num_to_keep=True
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 16], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 16], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
CorrFix only_train=True k=8
DecorrMin only_train=True k=8 num_to_keep=True
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
CorrFix only_train=True k=4
DecorrMin only_train=True k=4 num_to_keep=True
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
Concretize only_train=True
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
Linear out=500
ReLU
CorrelateAll only_train=False
Linear out=10
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Figure 9. SkipNet-18, None
Normalize mean=[0.4914, 0.4822, 0.4465] std=[0.2023, 0.1994, 0.201]
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 3], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[2, 2], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[2, 2], padding=0
ParSum
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[2, 2], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[2, 2], padding=0
ParSum
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[2, 2], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[4, 4, 512], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[2, 2], padding=0
ParSum
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[4, 4, 512], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[4, 4, 512], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Linear out=512
ReLU
Linear out=512
ReLU
CorrelateAll only_train=False
Linear out=10
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Figure 10. SkipNet-18, Combo
Normalize mean=[0.4914, 0.4822, 0.4465] std=[0.2023, 0.1994, 0.201]
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 3], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[2, 2], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[2, 2], padding=0
ParSum
ReLU
CorrFix only_train=True k=20
DecorrMin only_train=True k=10 num_to_keep=True
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
CorrFix only_train=True k=10
DecorrMin only_train=True k=5 num_to_keep=True
DeepLoss only_train=True bw=Until(90, Lin(%s,%s,%s,%s), 0.0) act=<function relu at 0x10b94d620>
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[2, 2], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[2, 2], padding=0
ParSum
ReLU
CorrFix only_train=True k=5
DecorrMin only_train=True k=2 num_to_keep=True
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[2, 2], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[4, 4, 512], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[2, 2], padding=0
ParSum
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[4, 4, 512], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[4, 4, 512], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Linear out=512
ReLU
Linear out=512
ReLU
CorrelateAll only_train=False
Linear out=10
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Figure 11. ResNet-Large, LargeCombo
Normalize mean=[0.4914, 0.4822, 0.4465] std=[0.2023, 0.1994, 0.201]
Conv2D, filters=16, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 3], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
CorrMaxK only_train=True num_correlate=4
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=16, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 16], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=16, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 16], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=16, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 16], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
CorrMaxK only_train=True num_correlate=4
DecorrMin only_train=True k=4 num_to_keep=True
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 16], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 16], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
CorrMaxK only_train=True num_correlate=4
DecorrMin only_train=True k=4 num_to_keep=True
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
DeepLoss only_train=True bw=Until(1, 0.0, Lin(0.5,0,50,3))
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=32, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
CorrMaxK only_train=True num_correlate=4
DecorrMin only_train=True k=4 num_to_keep=True
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 32], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
CorrMaxK only_train=True num_correlate=4
DecorrMin only_train=True k=2 num_to_keep=True
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
DeepLoss only_train=True bw=Until(24, Lin(0,0.1,20,4), Lin(0.1,0,50,0))
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParSum
ReLU
Linear out=1000
ReLU
CorrelateAll only_train=False
Linear out=10
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Figure 12. ResNet-18, None
Normalize mean=[0.4914, 0.4822, 0.4465] std=[0.2023, 0.1994, 0.201]
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 3], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[2, 2], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[2, 2], padding=0
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[2, 2], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[2, 2], padding=0
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[2, 2], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[4, 4, 512], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[2, 2], padding=0
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[4, 4, 512], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[4, 4, 512], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
Linear out=512
ReLU
Linear out=512
ReLU
CorrelateAll only_train=False
Linear out=10
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Figure 13. ResNet-34, None
Normalize mean=[0.4914, 0.4822, 0.4465] std=[0.2023, 0.1994, 0.201]
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 3], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=64, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[2, 2], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 64], stride=[2, 2], padding=0
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=128, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[2, 2], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[16, 16, 128], stride=[2, 2], padding=0
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
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ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=256, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[2, 2], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[4, 4, 512], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[8, 8, 256], stride=[2, 2], padding=0
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[4, 4, 512], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[4, 4, 512], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
ParNet1
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[4, 4, 512], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=512, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[4, 4, 512], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
ParNet2
ParSum
ReLU
Linear out=512
ReLU
Linear out=512
ReLU
CorrelateAll only_train=False
Linear out=10
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Figure 14. DenseNet-100, None
Normalize mean=[0.4914, 0.4822, 0.4465] std=[0.2023, 0.1994, 0.201]
Conv2D, filters=24, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 3], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 24], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 36], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 60], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 72], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 84], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 96], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 108], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 120], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 132], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
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Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 144], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 156], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 168], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 180], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 192], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 204], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[32, 32, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=108, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[32, 32, 216], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
AvgPool2D
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[17, 17, 108], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[17, 17, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[17, 17, 120], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[17, 17, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[17, 17, 132], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[17, 17, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[17, 17, 144], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[17, 17, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[17, 17, 156], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[17, 17, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[17, 17, 168], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
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ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[17, 17, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[17, 17, 180], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[17, 17, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[17, 17, 192], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[17, 17, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[17, 17, 204], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[17, 17, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[17, 17, 216], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[17, 17, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[17, 17, 228], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[17, 17, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[17, 17, 240], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[17, 17, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[17, 17, 252], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[17, 17, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[17, 17, 264], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[17, 17, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[17, 17, 276], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[17, 17, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[17, 17, 288], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[17, 17, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=150, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[17, 17, 300], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
AvgPool2D
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[9, 9, 150], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
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Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[9, 9, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[9, 9, 162], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[9, 9, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[9, 9, 174], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[9, 9, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[9, 9, 186], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[9, 9, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[9, 9, 198], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[9, 9, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[9, 9, 210], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[9, 9, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[9, 9, 222], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[9, 9, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[9, 9, 234], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[9, 9, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[9, 9, 246], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[9, 9, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[9, 9, 258], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[9, 9, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[9, 9, 270], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[9, 9, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[9, 9, 282], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[9, 9, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
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ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[9, 9, 294], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[9, 9, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[9, 9, 306], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[9, 9, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[9, 9, 318], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[9, 9, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
SkipNet1
SkipNet2
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=48, kernel_size=[1, 1], input_shape=[9, 9, 330], stride=[1, 1], padding=0
ReLU
Conv2D, filters=12, kernel_size=[3, 3], input_shape=[9, 9, 48], stride=[1, 1], padding=1
SkipCat dim=1
ReLU
AvgPool2D
CorrelateAll only_train=False
Linear out=10
CorrelateMax32
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DecorrMin8
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